is drawn. The second section outlines some basic dimensions of the M&A boom both in the United States and abroad-the volume, average size, sectoral composition, and geographical distribution. The final section focuses on three issues: the short-run impact of such mergers on the changing size of enterprises; the short-run implications of such mergers on market competition, using data on the extent to which such mergers involve enterprises in the same four-digit industries; and the probability that these merged enterprises represent a permanent change in market structure.
The Database
The tables in this essay are calculated from a database of mergers and acquisitions that is maintained by Thompson Financial Securities Data (TFSD).3 This commercial company collects information on publicly announced mergers and acquisitions in the world, using English and foreign language news sources, filings at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its international counterparts, trade publications, proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms, and other sources. The M&A data cover corporate transactions involving at least 5 percent of the ownership of a company where the transaction is valued at $1 million or more (after 1992, deals of any value are covered) or where the value of the transaction was undisclosed. Both public and private transactions are included.
From TFSD I purchased a listing of all M&A deals and their value as well as the names, standard industrial classification (SIC) codes, and nationality of the companies involved for 1985, 1992, and 1999. In addition, I obtained from them an aggregate time-series for the entire period from 1985 to the present. 4 Aside from straightforward mergers and acquisitions, transactions included in this database are purchases of large stakes, stock swaps, real estate investment trust (REIT) acquisitions, asset sales and divestitures, leveraged buyouts, tender offers, spinoffs and splitoffs, and so forth. These data do not, however, contain information on joint ventures, strategic alliances, or other such arrangements that may act to decrease competition (see Pryor 2001 a) nor on profits resulting from such mergers.
Since I wished to focus on transactions with a primary impact on the industrial structure, I adjusted the data on individual deals to eliminate the following transactions: apparent duplicates and leveraged buyouts (LBOs), own stock purchases, and other deals in which the firm is listed as purchasing itself. In addition, I eliminated all transactions involving private and miscellaneous investors (SIC 6799), since most of these seemed to represent a change in ownership rather than the managing or merging of two different companies.
The database is not ideal. Although TFSD began collecting these data in the early 1 980s, the company is reasonably confident of the completeness of the data only for the 1 990s. This means that the data for 1985 should be considered as a sample, rather than the full universe. Moreover, for roughly half of the merger deals, the value of the deal could not be determined, although it seems likely that these primarily involved smaller transactions and, as I show below, certain adjustments can be made to compensate for this problem. Finally, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of the information, especially the assigned SIC codes. Nevertheless, with suitable caution the data are usable for the purposes of this exposition.
Trends

Total Volume
The key question is the volume of mergers and their trend. Table 1 presents data for three years on the total volume of mergers and acquisitions, measured in terms of total number of mergers, total number of mergers with available data on the value of the deal, and total values of such mergers. I divided the mergers into four categories of transactions depending upon the nationality of the buying and the target companies.
Aside from the total recorded value of the deals, I also estimated the total value of all deals. This required an assumption about the ratio of the average value of the unrecorded deals to the average value of the recorded deals in the target industry. Since it is the smaller deals whose values are often not widely known, this ratio is a fraction of the value of the deals with reported dollar amounts. I have arbitrarily assumed that in each of fifteen different industrial sectors in each of the four different types of transactions (defined in terms of the nationality of the buyer and seller), the "critical ratio" of the value of the deals that are not announced is one sixth of the average value of the deals that are announced; in most cases these estimated values are close to the median size of merger. Obviously, this particular assumption can be challenged, but it turns out that the specific value chosen does not greatly affect the calculated trend in merger values. For instance, between 1992 and 1999 the total recorded value of deals grew at an annual rate of 35.7 percent. If the critical ratio is assumed to be 1/9, 1/6, or 1/3, the average annual growth rates in merger values in the same period were respectively 35.2, 35.1, and 34.6 percent. The total value of the deals is, of course, much more affected by such an assumption. More specifically, for the total deals in 1999, the estimated value would have been 5.5 percent lower or 16.4 percent higher if I had assumed the critical value to be respectively 1/9 or 1/3. Nevertheless, since I focused more on trends than on absolute values, this difference did not affect my major conclusions.
The estimated total volume of mergers and acquisitions rose at an average annual rate of 20.8 percent over the fourteen-year period from 1985 through 1999. By using aggregate annual data (that did not include the adjustments I made to the data) to interpolate between the benchmark years,5 this trend can be seen most dramatically in chart In 1999, total M&A activity involving US firms, either as a buyer or a seller, amounted to about $1.5 trillion. For comparison, the net stock of fixed reproducible non-residential tangible wealth of the private sector (excluding consumer durables) amounted to roughly $9.6 trillion in the same year.7 Thus, the relative magnitudes of M&A activities were large, even given the upward biases of the data on the total value of deals. At least for the purchase of US firms by non-US enterprises, the process was fueled by the US deficit in its balance of payments.
The merger process has a peculiar inner momentum. Such data have some pitfalls that deserve mention. We would certainly expect that the average size of merger transactions would vary considerably from year to year, depending on whether mega-deals occur. For 2000, for instance, the five mega-deals mentioned in the introduction certainly considerably raised the average value of mergers. As noted above, the absolute magnitudes of the average total deals were sensitive to the assumption about the relative size of recorded and non-recorded deals, even though the trends in these magnitudes were not greatly affected. Finally, in 1985, but not in later years, the merger data were truncated from below. Such results, combined with data presented below about the extent to which mergers have occurred in the same four-digit industries, reveal that in recent years merger activities have led to a considerable increase in industrial concentration.
Sector of Transaction
The results about average size of mergers when the relative number of deals is held constant mean that it is important to know in which sectors such a change in the The sectoral distributions of US purchase of non-US firms was different from the general pattern because the deals were dominated by some large purchases in the mining and financial sectors in the mid 1 980s. Purchases from the mining industry (which includes the petroleum industry) also played a large role in the purchase of US firms by non-US companies in the same period. This international consolidation of the mining sector, however, was played out by the late 1 990s, when mining deals accounted for only a small percentage of total mergers. By way of contrast, in the late 1 990s, consolidation in the banking sector had stepped up in the late 1990s and, for transborder mergers, the share of US purchases of non-US communication, utility, financial, and service enterprises increased dramatically.
Geographical Distribution of Buyers and Targets
Although table 1 shows a relative shift in the geographical distribution of merger activity from the US to foreign nations, it is useful to know whether such industrial concentration is occurring among industrial or developing nations. Table 4 (Pryor 200 lb) . If the foreign labor forces of US firms are included in the calculations, this conclusion of increasing enterprise size is reinforced. This result reflects, of course, the well-known tendency of large US firms to grow faster abroad than at home ). In Europe, the situation was even more striking: since the early 1960s the employment size of large industrial firms has been steadily increasing up to the end of the twentieth century.
Short-Run Impact on Market Concentration
The extent to which firms are merging with other enterprises in the same or different industries can be readily determined by comparing the four-digit SIC codes of the buying and target firms. For such an exercise it is useful to distinguish the primary and the various secondary SIC codes, even though in many cases the determination of the primary SIC code raises some difficulties. The relevant data for such an analysis are contained in table 5. The major conclusion can be concisely stated: In value terms, roughly two-thirds to three-fourths of all mergers with recorded deal values in the three benchmark years were within the same SIC industry. In 1999, 43.7 percent of mergers were between firms with the same primary SIC codes. Measured in terms of number, the share of mergers between firms with the same SIC codes was about half, which provides more evidence that the mergers involved large companies. In brief, horizontal mergers seemed to dominate M&A activity in the last fifteen years of the twentieth century. This is yet another way that the merger boom after 1985 was unique since in previous years; conglomerate or vertical mergers seemed to dominate. For instance, William N. showed that between 1960 and 1973, merger activity had no significant impact on market concentration.
The data in table 5 also provide several surprises. Contrary to expectations, horizontal mergers comprised a somewhat higher share of total mergers in the United States than abroad (the US-US mergers). I expected that because antitrust enforcement has been tougher in the United States than in most other countries, US companies would be more wary of such mergers. Moreover, firms in many non-US countries face a more regulated business environment, so that more specialized expertise in this regard is required of business managers. Thus, it might seem as though such cross-industrial mergers would be more risky outside the United States.
Several answers to this puzzle are possible. First, many of the horizontal mergers occurring in the United States are between firms in the same industry but in different markets, for instance, between banks dealing with geographically distinct markets, and such mergers are generally not subject to antitrust action. Second, because antitrust authorities have turned away from simple per se rules about ostensible market shares and are employing more sophisticated criteria-including international competitiveness-constraints on mergers arising from the possibility of antitrust action have been loosened. Third, US antitrust authorities have become more lax in their enforcement of current laws, in part because of budgetary constraints, in part because cross-border mergers are not considered worrisome. Finally, considerable deregulation has occurred abroad, especially among many OECD nations, so that the regulatory difficulties in cross-industry are much less severe than formerly.
Another surprise occurs because it would seem likely that horizontal mergers occurring across national lines would be in the same industry, reducing the risk of entering a new industry in a different nation. For non-US companies buying US firms, such an expectation is certainly met. Nevertheless, for US companies buying companies abroad, the share of such horizontal mergers is slightly below those of US firms buying other US firms. This puzzle is difficult to explain.
The increased industrial concentration that seems to be occurring as a result of these mergers is disturbing, because it suggests that market competition may decrease as well. Further, imports may serve as less of a competitive force in the US economy, either because the "foreign" enterprises exporting to the United States are owned by US firms or because industrial concentration among these non-US exporters is greater. Further exploration of this issue would, unfortunately, take us too far afield from the focus of this brief essay.
Long-Run Impacts
An important aftermath of the conglomerate merger boom in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States was a divestment of many of these purchases as enterprises turned back to their core businesses ("back to basics"). Given that a large share of the M&As in the current merger boom are horizontal, the probability of future divestment seems less.
In many cases where the two merged firms are producing the same product, there may be no obvious way of splitting the firm, especially if the two parts were closely integrated. Indeed, in many cases the major purpose of the merger was to gain market share so that the managers would not want to divest part of the firm, holding the long-run hope that eventually the firm would be highly profitable. When divestment occurs in troubled horizontal mergers, the unrelated parts of the firm are often the first to be divested, not the core business. For instance, in the latter part of the 1990s Aetna Insurance bought a number of other insurance firms including U.S. Healthcare ($8.9 billion), New York Life, NYL-Care ($ 1.1 billion), and Prudential HealthCare ($1 billion). These mergers did not prove successful and, after turning down several offers of purchase, the company began in early 2000 to split the firm into two separate companies, one focusing on health care and the other on financial services.9 In such a divestment, the increased market share of the mergers would be maintained.
Several long-term factors, however, seem likely to nullify some of the short-term anti-competitive aspects of the current merger boom: * Many of the mergers were carried out quickly and for allegedly defensive purposes. As a result, a considerable number of these mergers may founder in the future. Indeed, some of these mergers were between enterprises with weak market positions because of the lack of new products, either at the time of the merger or in the pipeline. In such cases, it is doubtful whether increased size will solve these problems. For instance, among the world's eighteen largest pharmaceutical companies, eleven of the twelve companies which experienced mergers lost (combined) market share between 1990 and 1998, while all six of the companies which had not merged gained market share (New Alchemy 2000). Similar difficulties have appeared in other mergers.10 * To the extent that smaller firms are more innovative, the long-run market share of these giant firms may erode.
As I have shown elsewhere (2001a; 2002), concentration ratios in the United States fell from the early 1960s up to the early 1980s and then began to increase. In the coming decade they seem likely to continue to increase further. Furthermore, even when concentration ratios are recalculated to add imports to total shipments in order to take crudely into account the impact of foreign competition, these trade-adjusted concentration ratios increased after the early 1980s. The merger boom seems to be the underlying cause.
The data provided above on the high degree of horizontal transatlantic mergers, not to mention horizontal mergers occurring where both enterprises are located abroad, provides support for the possibility that increased foreign trade may not provide the same competitive impulse that it provided in the past. For instance, it is not correct to argue that competition in the auto industry has increased because the import share is now larger than in the past, because the imports of Mercedes, Volvo, and Saab automobiles are now part of the product lines respectively of Chrysler, Ford, and GM. Recent purchases by US auto companies of large shares of Japanese auto makers (for instance, DaimlerChrysler's purchase of a controlling interest of Mitsubishi Motor Corporation) make this situation even worse.
In brief, if the world merger boom of the 1 990s continues into the new millennium and if horizontal divestments do not increase in a spectacular manner, industrial concentration will increase in the United States, in other OECD nations, and in the world as a whole. 
